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ARE GOOD DEEDS BEING PUNISHED?:  
INDEPENDENT CHARITY PATIENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
AND THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE 
John C. Hood† * 
Abstract 
Largely funded by the pharmaceutical industry, Independent Charity 
Patient Assistance Programs (PAPs) dispense billions of dollars of aid 
annually to help financially vulnerable patients afford their prescription 
drugs. Recently, these charitable entities and their drug company donors 
have faced mounting legal scrutiny for allegedly funneling illegal 
kickbacks to Medicare beneficiaries. This Note examines Independent 
Charity PAPs and the issues they raise under the Anti-Kickback Statute 
(AKS). It explores the uncertain legal environment in which Independent 
Charity PAPs operate and concludes that a new AKS regulatory safe 
harbor may be necessary to preserve the viability of the safety net 
assistance that Independent Charity PAPs provide. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“It’s terrifying . . . I am going to die without this,” was Irene Adkins’s 
reaction to the prospect of losing financial support from Caring Voice 
Coalition, Inc. (CVC).1 Like many Medicare beneficiaries, Irene relied 
upon aid from CVC—an Independent Charity Patient Assistance 
Program (PAP)—to afford her cost-sharing responsibility for the drugs 
necessary to treat her pulmonary hypertension condition.2 In early 2018, 
Irene’s fear was realized when CVC announced that it would no longer 
offer financial assistance to patients.3  
CVC based its decision on a move by the Office of the Inspector 
General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) to rescind a favorable advisory opinion that had approved of the 
aid CVC provided to Medicare beneficiaries.4 CVC’s announcement also 
came on the heels of a $210 million settlement agreement between 
pharmaceutical manufacturer United Therapeutics Corp. (UT) and the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to resolve claims that UT had illegally 
“used [CVC] as a conduit to pay the copay obligations of thousands of 
Medicare patients . . . and to induce those patients’ purchases” of UT’s 
“[P]ulmonary [A]rterial [H]ypertension” (PAH) drugs.5 
 
 1. Robert Langreth & Ben Elgin, ‘I Am Going to Die Without This’: Regulators Target a 
Health-Care Lifesaver, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/articles/2017-12-21/-i-am-going-to-die-without-this-regulators-target-a-health-care-
lifesaver [https://perma.cc/BZH4-F83X]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Greg Smiley, A Decision on 2018 Financial Assistance, CARING VOICE COALITION 
(Jan. 4, 2018), http://www.caringvoice.org/ decision-2018-financial-assistance/ [https://perma. 
cc/QP47-WXKH]; Langreth & Elgin, supra note 1. 
 4. See Smiley, supra note 3; Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., Final Notice of Rescission of OIG Advisory Opinion No. 06-04 (Nov. 28, 2017) 
[hereinafter OIG Rescission of Adv. Op. No. 06-04], https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisory 
opinions/2017/AdvOpnRescission06-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GMA-EQ3S]; Langreth & Elgin, 
supra note 1. 
 5. Settlement Agreement at 1, 2 (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/press-
release/file/1019336/download [https://perma.cc/2AC2-SHDU]; see Press Release, Office of Pub. 
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On the same day that CVC announced it would be suspending 
financial aid indefinitely, the OIG took extraordinary action to open 
another avenue of aid for patients like Irene and sent an urgent letter to a 
pharmaceutical trade association representative promising that the 
agency:  
[would] not pursue administrative sanctions against any 
Drug Company for providing free drugs during 2018 to 
Federal health care program beneficiaries who were 
receiving cost sharing support for those drugs from CVC as 
of November 28, 2017, as long as the Drug Company 
complie[d] with the safeguards described in [the] letter.6 
The CVC saga is representative of the mounting scrutiny that 
Independent Charity PAPs and their pharmaceutical industry benefactors 
face.7 It also illustrates the chilling effect this scrutiny has had upon the 
charities and their donors.8 CVC ceased operations on May 1, 2019,9 and 
late last year federal prosecutors announced that another drug maker, 
Actelion Pharmaceuticals, had agreed to pay $360 million to settle 
allegations that it too had used CVC to illegally funnel kickbacks to 
Medicare beneficiaries.10 
Such deterrence may be warranted. Critics contend that Independent 
Charity PAPs undermine the economic benefits of cost-sharing and result 
in “hidden costs for insurers and taxpayers.”11 However, proponents of 
 
Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Drug Maker United Therapeutics Agrees to Pay $210 Million to Resolve 
False Claims Act Liability for Paying Kickbacks (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/drug-maker-united-therapeutics-agrees-pay-210-million-resolve-false-claims-act-liability 
[https://perma.cc/NCQ8-27D3]. 
 6. Letter from Gregory E. Demske, Chief Counsel to the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t Health 
& Human Servs., to James C. Stansel, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Pharm. Research & 
Mfrs. of Am. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/alerts/guidance/stansel-letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8X3G-TFMX]. 
 7. See Langreth & Elgin, supra note 1. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See CaringVoiceCoalition (@CVCinc), TWITTER (May 1, 2019, 7:40 AM), 
https://twitter.com/CVCinc/status/1123598130098864128 [https://perma.cc/33V9 -CJFR] 
(announcing that CVC would cease operations after May 1, 2019); see also CARING VOICE 
COALITION, http://www.caringvoice.org/ [https://perma.cc/VN3L-QY2R] (“Caring Voice 
Coalition’s last full day of operation was May 1, 2019.”).  
 10. See, e.g., Katie Thomas, Drug Maker Pays $360 Million to Settle Investigation into 
Charity Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/health/ 
actelion-johnson-and-johnson-kickback-medicare.html [https://perma.cc/EY4X-G42D]. 
 11. David H. Howard, Drug Companies’ Patient-Assistance Programs—Helping Patients 
or Profits?, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 97, 99 (2014); see also Peter A. Ubel & Peter B. Bach, Copay 
Assistance for Expensive Drugs: A Helping Hand That Raises Costs, 165 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
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Independent Charity PAPs argue that “[c]ausing companies to stop 
offering PAPs would leave many patients with chronic conditions out in 
the cold with respect to prescription drug access.”12 Moreover, limiting 
access to prescription drugs could increase utilization of high-cost health 
care interventions, such as hospitalizations.13 
The OIG, the federal agency tasked with civil enforcement of the 
Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), has long recognized the potential benefits 
of Independent Charity PAPs.14 Yet, the OIG’s frenetic response to 
CVC’s abrupt decision to halt its provision of financial assistance 
illuminates a critical challenge: How can the OIG protect the integrity of 
federal health care programs, such as Medicare Part D, from abusive uses 
of Independent Charity PAPs without cutting down the seemingly critical 
pharmaceutical safety net that these entities provide to financially 
vulnerable patients? 
This Note explores the challenge of identifying a balanced regulatory 
approach to Independent Charity PAPs, and it proceeds in three parts. 
Part I explains how Independent Charity PAPs work, traces their history, 
and analyzes their impact. Part II provides a thumbnail sketch of the AKS 
and an overview of the OIG’s AKS guidance related to Independent 
Charity PAPs. It also reviews recent legal scrutiny of Independent 
Charity PAP donors. Part III explains how this recent scrutiny has 
precipitated an uncertain legal environment for Independent Charity 
PAPs and analyzes whether a new AKS safe harbor is warranted to clarify 
the AKS implications of pharmaceutical manufacturer donations made to 
Independent Charity PAPs. This Note concludes by suggesting that if 
Independent Charity PAPs are worth preserving, the OIG should 
promulgate an AKS regulatory safe harbor for Independent Charity PAPs 
and their industry donors. 
I.  INDEPENDENT CHARITY PAPS: A PRIMER 
Pharmaceutical PAPs dispense billions of dollars of free drugs and 
financial assistance annually to help qualifying individuals defray the 
cost of prescription drugs.15 This Part defines and describes these entities, 
 
 12. See Myrl Weinberg, Reforming Patient Assistance Programs: Perfect World Meets 
Real World, 28 HEALTH AFF. 839, 840 (2009). 
 13. Judy T. Chen & Kent H. Summers, Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Prescription 
Assistance Programs: Are They Worth It?, 13 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 611, 613 (2007). 
 14. See, e.g., Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs 
for Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,623, 70,624–25 (Nov. 22, 2005). 
 15. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44264, PRESCRIPTION DRUG DISCOUNT COUPONS AND 
PATIENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (PAPS) 1 (2017). This Note focuses exclusively on PAPs that 
target patient access to pharmaceuticals, but it is worth noting that similar programs exist in other 
sectors of the health care industry. See, e.g., Brad M. Beall, Note, Investing in the Ill: The Need 
to Curb Third-Party Payment of Qualified Health Plan Premiums, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1339, 1353 
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explains their origins, and examines their controversial relations with 
pharmaceutical industry donors. 
A.  Pharmaceutical PAP Typology 
Two of the most common forms of Pharmaceutical PAPs are 
“Pharmaceutical Manufacturer PAPs” and “Independent Charity 
PAPs.”16 Pharmaceutical Manufacturer PAPs are directly associated with 
specific pharmaceutical manufacturers.17 They include pharmaceutical 
companies’ “own 501(c)(3) organizations, which often are set up as 
private foundations.”18 Pharmaceutical companies use these PAPs to 
supply “drugs directly to patients who cannot afford them.”19 The scale 
of Pharmaceutical Manufacturer PAP funding is substantial. The 
Foundation Center, an organization that tracks philanthropic giving, 
counts ten Pharmaceutical Manufacturer PAPs among the twenty largest 
charitable foundations in the United States as measured by total giving in 
2015.20 The annual giving of many Pharmaceutical Manufacturer PAPs 
 
(2017) (discussing payments made by “provider-affiliated nonprofits” to help defray the cost of 
Qualified Health Plans (QHPs) for individuals demonstrating financial need). 
 16. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 15, at 15; see Publication of OIG Special Advisory 
Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. at 70,624 
(“Some PAPs are affiliated with particular pharmaceutical manufacturers; others are operated by 
independent charitable organizations . . . without regard to any specific donor or industry 
interests.”); RAMSEY BAGHDADI, HEALTH AFFAIRS, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF: PATIENT FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT 2 (2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171409.000176/full/ [https:// 
perma.cc/TM2F-AP4J] (“Manufacturers may either sponsor their own PAPs . . . or donate to 
independent foundations that then provide patients with financial assistance.”); Austin Frerick, 
The Cloak of Social Responsibility: Pharmaceutical Corporate Charity, 153 TAX NOTES 1151, 
1157 (2016) (discussing the differences between Manufacturer PAPs and Independent Charity 
PAPs). 
 17. See Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for 
Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. at 70,624 n.3 (defining Pharmaceutical Manufacturer 
PAPs as “any PAP that is directly or indirectly operated or controlled in any manner by a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer or its affiliates”). 
 18. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 15, at 15, 17 (“Private foundations often are tightly 
controlled, receive significant portions of their funds from a small number of donors, and make 
grants to other organizations rather than directly carry out charitable activities.”). 
 19. Frerick, supra note 16, at 1157; see also Application for HUMIRA® (adalimumab), 
MYABBVIE ASSIST (Sept. 2019), https://www.abbvie.com/content/dam/abbvie-dotcom/uploads/ 
PDFs/pap/humira-patient-assistance-application.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LHP-FWRE] (“myAbbVie Assist 
provides free medicine to qualifying patients.”). 
 20. See Fiscal Totals of the 50 Largest Foundations in the U.S. by Total Giving, 2015, 
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surpasses that of “more well-known foundations such as the Ford 
Foundation.”21 
Independent Charity PAPs, on the other hand, are operated by 
charitable entities that are separate from pharmaceutical manufacturers.22 
These entities are typically organized as public charities,23 which tend to 
“have broad public support and tend to provide charitable services 
directly to the intended beneficiaries.”24 However, Independent Charity 
PAPs are often largely funded by donations made by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.25 This drug maker largesse is of such a grand scale that 
two Independent Charity PAPs—Patient Access Network Foundation 
(PAN Foundation) and Good Days—rank among the 100 largest not-for-
profit organizations in the United States.26 
Independent Charity PAPs “offer aid such as financial assistance to 
uninsured consumers or underinsured consumers who cannot meet their 
health plans’ premiums or cost sharing, such as co-payments, 
coinsurance, and deductibles.”27 Common aid eligibility criteria include: 
 
 21. Fiona Scott Morton & Lysle T. Boller, Enabling Competition in Pharmaceutical 
Markets 29 (Hutchins Ctr., Working Paper No. 30, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/wp30_scottmorton_competitioninpharma1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS2G 
-MBF5]; see also Fiscal Totals of the 50 Largest Foundations in the U.S. by Total Giving, 2015, 
supra note 20 (ranking the total giving of charitable foundations in 2015). 
 22. See Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for 
Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. at 70,624 (noting that Independent Charity PAPs operate 
“without regard to any specific donor or industry interests”). 
 23. See, e.g., Publication 78 Data for Patient Access Network Foundation, TAX EXEMPT 
ORG. SEARCH, https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/ (select search by “Organization Name”; then search 
organization name “Patient Access Network Foundation”; then follow “Patient Access Network 
Foundation” hyperlink) (listing “Deductibility Code: PC [(Public Charity)]”) [https://perma.cc/ 
WG8S-6CZJ]. 
 24. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 15, at 16. 
 25. See Jonathan D. Rockoff, U.S. Probe Sheds Light on Charities’ Role in Boosting Drug 
Sales, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-probe-sheds-light-on-charities-role-in-
boosting-drug-sales-1497000601 [https://perma.cc/FJC4-DCFG] (last updated June 11, 2017, 
9:24 PM) (“The eight biggest [Independent Charity PAPs] got more than $1.1 billion in donations 
mostly from drug companies in 2014 . . . .”); see also Ben Elgin & Robert Langreth, How Big 
Pharma Uses Charity Programs to Cover for Drug Price Hikes, BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2016, 6:00 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-19/the-real-reason-big-pharma-wants-
to-help-pay-for-your-prescription [https://perma.cc/Z43P-7WDM] (reporting that Novartis 
contributed “just over half” of Independent Charity PAP Patient Services, Inc.’s 2014 funding and 
that “[a]bout 95 percent” of Independent Charity PAP PAN Foundation’s contributions are 
provided by pharmaceutical companies). 
 26. See NPT Top 100 (2019): An In-Depth Study of America’s Largest NonProfits, 
NONPROFIT TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.thenonprofittimes.com/report/npt-top-100-2019-
an-in-depth-study-of-americas-largest-nonprofits/ [https://perma.cc/FQ6G-C44P] (ranking PAN 
Foundation thirty-eighth and Good Days eighty-ninth based on 2018 revenues of $540,784,733 
and $240,058,988, respectively). 
 27. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 15, at 15. 
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“(1) annual income, (2) insurance status, (3) physician endorsement, (4) 
prescription information, and (5) proof of U.S. citizenship or legal 
residence.”28 Patient income eligibility limits are often tied to the Federal 
Poverty Level (FPL).29 However, many Independent Charity PAPs adjust 
income limits according to drug prices, raising income eligibility limits 
for more expensive drugs.30 The financial support these entities provide 
is usually limited to a specific time period.31 
B.  A Brief History of Independent Charity PAPs 
Independent Charity PAPs arose in response to high out-of-pocket 
costs associated with novel pharmaceutical and biologic treatments.32 In 
contrast to Pharmaceutical Manufacturer PAPs, which often target 
uninsured patients and limit aid to company-specific products, the 
flexibility of Independent Charity PAPs offered a way for insured patients 
to maintain their coverage and defray the out-of-pocket costs of multiple 
treatments, regardless of manufacturer.33 Founded in 1989, Patient 
Services Inc. (PSI) is often credited as the first Independent Charity 
PAP.34 PSI’s President, Dana Kuhn, a former hospital counselor, started 
the charity after seeing chronic disease patients “taking drastic steps to 
get [health insurance] coverage, including one couple who got divorced 
so the mother and child could go on Medicaid.”35 Many Independent 
Charity PAPs, like PSI, see themselves as offering a lifeline to patients 
“who make too much money to qualify for a free drug program” but 
nonetheless cannot afford their steep co-payments.36 According to Kuhn, 
these financially vulnerable patients might otherwise get caught in a 
 
 28. Id. at 17. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Tina Shah, Copayment Foundations: Help for the Underinsured, 5 
BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 41, 41 (2008); see also Geeta Anand, Through Charities, Drug 
Makers Help People—and Themselves, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1133398 
02749110822 [https://perma.cc/VZQ8-WGV9] (last updated Dec. 1, 2005, 12:01 AM) (“To cope 
with rising medical costs, insurers are requiring patients to pay higher premiums and co-payments 
for drugs. While poor uninsured patients can often get expensive medicine free from drug 
companies, people with insurance are increasingly finding it difficult to afford these drugs. In 
response, drug companies are giving money to charities that are specifically set up to help patients 
pay such costs.”). 
 33. See Shah, supra note 32, at 41.  
 34. See id. at 42. 
 35. Jayne O’Donnell et al., Drug Co-Pay Groups: Critical Patient Charities or Fronts for 
Drugmakers?, USA TODAY (Apr. 26, 2018, 7:09 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
politics/2018/04/26/drug-co-payments-groups-patient-charities-drugmakers-affordable-care-act/ 
485524002/ [https://perma.cc/K5B2-AYZ4]. 
 36. Id. 
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tragic cycle where they “stop taking their drugs, their conditions become 
exacerbated so they go to emergency rooms where they can’t be denied 
their drug and can get stabilized for little or no money.”37 
Since the late 1980s, an increasingly broad array of Independent 
Charity PAPs has developed.38 These not-for-profit organizations offer 
similar assistance but “vary in size, disease focus, and other forms of 
aid.”39 During the past few decades, Independent Charity PAPs have 
grown in scale.40 A study of tax data found that, between 2004 and 2014, 
giving by Independent Charity PAPs rose from $11 million to $868 
million,41 and “surged” to $1.35 billion in 2015.42 The PAN 
Foundation—the largest Independent Charity PAP43—“increased its 
annual grants and donations from about $38 million in 2010 to $496 
million in 2014 and $942 million in 2015.”44 Among the Independent 
Charity PAPs analyzed in a 2019 study, “total revenue in 2017 ranged 
from $24 million to $532 million, and expenditures on patient assistance 
programs ranged from $24 million to $353 million, representing, on 
average, 86% of their revenue.”45 
The rapid rise in spending by Independent Charity PAPs has likely 
been driven by “the expansion of publicly funded insurance and [the 
proliferation of] specialty drugs.”46 The Medicare Modernization Act of 
200347 created the Medicare Part D program, “a voluntary outpatient drug 
benefit” for Medicare beneficiaries.48 By 2016, “nearly forty-two million 
people” had enrolled in Part D.49 The federally subsidized program “pays 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Shah, supra note 32, at 42. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (“Since the [HealthWell Foundation (HWF) and the [PAN] Foundation’s] inception 
in 2003, these organizations have helped more than 50,000 and 25,000 patients, respectively.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 41. Frerick, supra note 16, at 1158. 
 42. Austin Frerick, Letter to the Editor, An Update on Pharmaceutical Corporate Charity, 
TAX NOTES, May 8, 2017, at 857. 
 43. Id. at 858 (noting that PAN Foundation “represented 70 percent of all independent 
charity giving in 2015”). 
 44. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 15, at 21–22.  
 45. So-Yeon Kang et al., Financial Eligibility Criteria and Medication Coverage for 
Independent Charity Patient Assistance Programs, 322 JAMA 422, 424 (2019). 
 46. Frerick, supra note 16, at 1159. 
 47. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
 48. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, PART D PAYMENT SYSTEM 1 (2018), 
http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/payment-basics/medpac_payment_basics_18_partd_ 
final_sec.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/Y2RF-KA9T]. 
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for almost two billion prescriptions annually, representing nearly $90 
billion in spending.”50  
The AKS prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from providing 
financial assistance or discounts to patients for products paid for by 
federal health insurance programs.51 However, OIG guidance indicates 
that a pharmaceutical manufacturer may donate to Independent Charity 
PAPs—without implicating the AKS—provided that the charity and the 
assistance it allocates are sufficiently insulated from the manufacturer.52 
Hence, as Medicare beneficiaries increasingly enrolled in Part D plans, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers were likely motivated to boost donations 
to Independent Charity PAPs because Pharmaceutical Manufacturer 
PAPs could no longer be relied upon to address this population.53 
Another potential driver of the growth of Independent Charity PAPs 
may be the recent rise in spending on specialty drugs.54 There is no 
common definition of specialty drugs, but the category often includes 
expensive drugs “used to treat complex diseases including multiple 
sclerosis, cancer, and hepatitis C” as well as some biologics and orphan 
drugs.55 In recent years, “spending for specialty drugs has grown faster 
than spending for other pharmaceuticals.”56 In addition, these high price 
drugs are causing more Medicare Part D beneficiaries to reach the 
catastrophic phase of their benefit.57 As a result, many Part D 
beneficiaries, particularly those who do not qualify for the program’s 
Low-Income Subsidy (LIS),58 bear steep cost-sharing responsibilities.59 
In 2015, the average annual out-of-pocket spending among high-cost Part 
D beneficiaries who did not qualify for the LIS was $2,958.60 Many of 
these beneficiaries turn to Independent Charity PAPs to meet their cost-
 
 50. Id. 
 51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012); infra Section II.A. 
 52. See Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for 
Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,623, 70,624 (Nov. 22, 2005); infra Section II.C. 
 53. See Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for 
Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. at 70,624 (“[W]e conclude that pharmaceutical 
manufacturer PAPs that subsidize Part D cost-sharing amounts present heightened risks under the 
antikickback statute.”). 
 54. See Frerick, supra note 16, at 1159. 
 55. SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44132, SPECIALTY DRUGS: 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY CONCERNS 1 (2015). 
 56. Frerick, supra note 16, at 1159. 
 57. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY 421 (2018). 
 58. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-114 (2012) (providing subsidies for qualifying low-income 
Medicare beneficiaries). 
 59. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 57, at 424. 
 60. See id.  
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sharing requirements.61 Indeed, specialty pharmacies that dispense 
specialty drugs often connect patients with Independent Charity PAPs.62 
C.  The Impacts of PAPs 
Little is known about how effectively PAPs improve patient access to 
drugs.63 A 2009 study of PAPs highlighted “the lack of transparency that 
exists surrounding drug company-sponsored PAPs”64 and concluded that 
it is unclear how effectively PAPs promote access to medications.65 
Similarly, recently published research has found that Independent Charity 
PAPs typically disclose neither drug maker donations “nor . . . the actual 
allocation of financial assistance across specific drugs.”66  
Despite the dearth of information available about PAPs, some 
evidence suggests that they are beneficial to patients. A literature review 
found that “PAP enrollment assistance plus additional medication 
services (e.g., counseling, free samples) is associated with improved 
disease indicators for patients with chronic diseases” but stressed that 
“few inferences” about “the effectiveness, use, or value of PAPs” could 
be drawn from existing research on PAPs due to “limitations in the 
studies’ designs.”67 A 2014 study of uninsured patients found that 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer “PAPs were successful in providing 
significant medication cost savings for patients” but provided only “brand 
name prescription drugs, which are typically more expensive” than 
generic drugs.68 Likewise, the authors of a study published in 2017 noted 
that PAPs are a useful tool to “help patients bridge their cancer care costs” 
and “may reduce [out-of-pocket] costs for select patients who can prove 
financial need and are filling prescriptions for certain high-priced drugs” 
 
 61. Cf. Joseph Walker, Patients Struggle with High Drug Prices, WALL ST. J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/patients-struggle-with-high-drug-prices-1451557981 [https:// 
perma.cc/R7G9-BSPU] (last updated Dec. 31, 2015, 10:38 AM) (describing middle-class 
Medicare patients’ struggles to afford the out-of-pocket costs associated with expensive 
prescription drugs and their reliance upon Independent Charity PAPs for financial assistance). 
 62. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 57, at 414. 
 63. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 15, at 22. 
 64. Niteesh K. Choudhry et al., Drug Company-Sponsored Patient Assistance Programs: A 
Viable Safety Net?, 28 HEALTH AFF. 827, 832 (2009). 
 65. Id. at 833. 
 66. Kang et al., supra note 45, at 427 (noting that “[t]his lack of transparency” impedes 
efforts to assess whether “the activities of [Independent Charity PAPs] are aligned with their 
charitable missions”). 
 67. Tisha M. Felder et al., What is the Evidence for Pharmaceutical Patient Assistance 
Programs?: A Systematic Review, 22 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 24, 44, 45 
(2011). 
 68. Yelba M. Castellon et al., The Impact of Patient Assistance Programs and the 340B 
Drug Pricing Program on Medication Cost, 20 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 146, 148 (2014). 
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but cautioned that “PAPs may do so by shifting cost to health insurers.”69 
The study analyzed oncology prescriptions filled by an academic cancer 
center’s specialty pharmacy and found that among the “[t]welve percent 
of prescriptions . . . that received PAP assistance, the median amount of 
financial assistance provided per prescription was $411.10 . . . which 
amounted to 15% of the median prescription cash price.”70 
A descriptive study of specialty pharmacy patients who received 
assistance from an Independent Charity PAP found that “[t]he mean 
annual per capita income was $19,159” and that “all [of the] patients had 
an income at or below 500% of the FPL based on household size.”71 The 
patients were predominately insured by Medicare Part B or Medicare Part 
D and most of the patients were at least sixty-five years old.72 The 
overwhelming majority of the patients “were receiving assistance for 
oncology medications.”73 The patients faced an “average initial co-pay of 
$728 per patient per year” and received “an average of $722 in financial 
assistance” from the Independent Charity PAP.74 
D.  Controversial Donor Relations 
It is an “open secret” that Independent Charity PAPs are largely 
funded by contributions made by pharmaceutical companies.75 It has also 
 
 69. Leah L. Zullig et al., The Role of Patient Financial Assistance Programs in Reducing 
Costs for Cancer Patients, 23 J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 407, 410 (2017) 
(concluding that “PAPs played a relatively small role in reducing the cost of [oral anticancer 
medication] prescriptions” because “[f]ew patients received PAP assistance, and among those 
who did, PAPs covered only a small proportion of [out-of-pocket] costs”). The study did not 
distinguish between Pharmaceutical Manufacturer PAPs and Independent Charity PAPs. See id. 
 70. Id. at 408–10. The study defined “cash price” as “[a] reduced price offered to patients 
paying cash on the day of their prescription fills.” Id. at 408. 
 71. Julia Zhu et al., A Descriptive Study of Patients Receiving Foundational Financial 
Assistance Through Local Specialty Pharmacies, 24 AM. J. MANAGED CARE S80, S81–S82, S83 
(2018) (noting that patients often abandon drug therapies when their out-of-pocket expenses 
exceed $250 and speculating that the reduction in co-pays among the study population “might 
have helped decrease the medication abandonment rate”). 
 72. Id. at S82. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Andrew Pollack, Drug Maker’s Donations to Co-Pay Charity Face Scrutiny, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/19/business/shake-up-at-big-co-pay-
fund-raises-scrutiny-on-similar-charities.html [https://perma.cc/5X3U-6P8A]; see also 
HEALTHWELL FOUND., WHEN HEALTH INSURANCE IS NOT ENOUGH: HOW CHARITABLE 
COPAYMENT ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS ENHANCE PATIENT ACCESS TO CARE 5 (2012),  
https://www.healthwellfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy/files/HWF-white%20paper% 
20for%20printing.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3MK-N3BB] (noting that the providing of financial 
assistance to patients “would not be possible without the generous support of pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industry donors”); PAN Facts & Stats, PAN FOUND., https://panfoundation.org/ 
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been reported that many Independent Charity PAPs solicit donations 
directly from pharmaceutical manufacturers.76 Moreover, one 
Independent Charity PAP has reportedly pitched pharmaceutical industry 
donations as a “win-win situation” whereby companies “make a small 
contribution to help the patient and get much more money back when the 
insurer pays for the drug.”77  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, pharmaceutical companies’ donations to 
Independent Charity PAPs have raised eyebrows.78 Dr. David Howard 
suggests that Independent Charity PAPs are a “triple boon for 
manufacturers” because “[t]hey increase demand, allow companies to 
charge higher prices, and provide public-relations benefits.”79 According 
to Dr. Howard, pharmaceutical manufacturers can use donations to 
Independent Charity PAPs as a way to “blunt the impact of drug 
copayments and coinsurance on patients” and thereby increase demand 
for expensive drugs among price-conscious patients who would 
otherwise opt not to take an expensive drug.80 Dr. Howard also contends 
that, by reducing patients’ price sensitivity, Independent Charity PAPs 
“may lead to higher drug prices” because pharmaceutical companies are 
relieved of the economic effects of patient cost-sharing that help keep 
prices in check.81  
Similarly, Dr. Peter Ubel and Dr. Peter Bach argue that Independent 
Charity PAPs will increase overall health care costs by “reduc[ing] public 
outcry over outrageous drug prices” and enabling pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to “sidestep” insurer price negotiations—keeping the costs 
borne by patients low, “even when insurers are aiming to keep them 
high.”82 So-Yeon Kang and her colleagues echo this concern. Concluding 
that the drugs covered by the Independent Charity PAPs they studied 
 
index.php/en/about-us/media-room/pan-facts-stats [https://perma.cc/BVD8-LFLW] (“The majority 
of PAN’s funding comes from pharmaceutical companies.”). 
 76. See Anand, supra note 32 (“Patient Services developed the concept of soliciting drug-
company money to pay insurance premiums, the National Organization for Rare Disorders, a 
Connecticut nonprofit, recently began performing the same kind of middleman role.”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Alex Berenson, In Drug-Aid Foundations, a Web of Corporate Interests, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/08/business/in-drugaid-foundations-a-
web-of-corporate-interests.html [https://perma.cc/G5XE-78UL] (noting that critics of 
Independent Charity PAPs “worry that they are little more than ways for drug makers to sustain 
their high prices by funneling patients enough money to meet their co-payments, while letting 
insurers pick up most of the bill”); see also Anand, supra note 32 (“[Critics] argue that by paying 
patients’ premiums or co-payments, drug companies are shifting most of the price of these 
medicines to the patients’ insurers, who in turn spread the cost onto the other people they cover.”). 
 79. Howard, supra note 11, at 97. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 98. 
 82. Ubel & Bach, supra note 11, at 878. 
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“were generally more expensive than those that were not covered,” Kang 
and her colleagues caution that Independent Charity PAPs “can 
desensitize beneficiaries to the total price of the drug and thus undermine 
the purpose of co-payments and coinsurance.”83 This is especially 
problematic for the Medicare Part D program because beneficiaries who 
choose higher cost drugs will reach catastrophic coverage faster.84 
The story of a Medicare beneficiary named Vivian illustrates how 
Independent Charity PAPs can simultaneously help patients gain access 
to drugs and generate revenue for pharmaceutical manufacturers. When 
Vivian’s “rare gastrointestinal tumor recurred,” she was prescribed an 
expensive cancer drug.85 Although Vivian and her husband Ronald 
qualified for prescription drug coverage under Medicare,86 their “income 
of $2,000 a month put them in a group required to pay $3,600 a year 
before being eligible for the drug benefit” and also required them “to pay 
5% of each prescription.”87 To afford those cost-sharing requirements and 
gain access to the drug, Vivian and her husband turned to an Independent 
Charity PAP that was funded by the manufacturer of the cancer drug.88 
The Independent Charity PAP reported assisting 1,255 cancer patients 
through programs funded by the manufacturer.89 If each of those patients, 
like Vivian, used the aid to purchase the manufacturer’s cancer drug 
through drug benefits that covered a significant portion of the $37,000 
annual average wholesale price of the drug,90 the Independent Charity 
 
 83. Kang et al., supra note 45, at 427, 429 (“The [study’s] finding [that Independent Charity 
PAPs offer] preferential coverage of high-priced specialty and brand-name drugs over generic 
equivalents adds to a growing body of literature suggesting that co-payment assistance programs 
may motivate physicians and patients to choose treatment options with a lower out-of-pocket cost 
burden despite the higher total cost and the availability of lower-cost alternatives.”). 
 84. Id. at 427. 
 85. Anand, supra note 32. 
 86. The couple was covered “under a pilot Medicare program” similar to the Medicare Part 
D program. Id. Generally, under the Medicare Part D: 
Medicare beneficiaries can purchase drug coverage subject to a deductible of 
$250 per year, 25% co-pays on the next $2,000 spent, no coverage for the next 
$2,850 spent (a gap referred to as the “doughnut hole”), and 5% co-pays on any 
additional amounts spent during the year (so-called “catastrophic” 
coverage) . . . . The program relies on private insurers to offer seniors a variety 
of options (differing primarily in the lists of drugs covered, which can change 
monthly while beneficiaries could only change plans once a year). 
LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 883 (4th ed. 2017).  
 87. Anand, supra note 32. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Medicare Part D plans cover 75% of drug costs during the initial phase of the benefit 
and, during the catastrophic phase of the benefit, the plans cover “15 percent of the cost of drugs 
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PAP could have facilitated “tens of millions of dollars” of sales of the 
drug among patients who otherwise would not have been able to afford 
it.91 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE AND ITS 
APPLICATION TO INDEPENDENT CHARITY PAPS 
In 2015, the DOJ began to closely scrutinize pharmaceutical 
manufacturer donations to Independent Charity PAPs.92 Since then, 
federal prosecutors have announced settlements with at least ten 
pharmaceutical manufacturers93 and at least three Independent Charity 
PAPs.94 The settlements resolve allegations of False Claims Act (FCA)95 
violations premised upon the theory that donations made to Independent 
 
over the catastrophic limit, with the beneficiary paying 5 percent and the federal subsidy (known 
as reinsurance) paying the remaining 80 percent.” See MCCAUGHAN, supra note 49, at 2, 3. 
 91. Anand, supra note 32. 
 92. See Rockoff, supra note 25.  
 93. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dep’t of Justice, Actelion Pharms. Agrees 
to Pay $360 Million to Resolve Allegations that It Paid Kickbacks Through a Co-Pay Assistance 
Found. (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/actelion-pharmaceuticals-agrees-pay-
360-million-resolve-allegations-it-paid-kickbacks [https://perma.cc/B4AY-D22F]; Press Release, 
Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Drug Maker Aegerion Agrees to Plead Guilty; Will Pay 
More than $35 Million to Resolve Criminal Charges & Civil False Claims Allegations (Sept. 22, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/drug-maker-aegerion-agrees-plead-guilty-will-pay-more-
35-million-resolve-criminal-charges-and [https://perma.cc/WL2K-AYEE]; Press Release, Office 
of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Drug Maker Pfizer Agrees to Pay $23.85 Million to Resolve 
False Claims Act Liability for Paying Kickbacks (May 24, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/drug-maker-pfizer-agrees-pay-2385-million-resolve-false-claims-act-liability-paying-
kickbacks [https://perma.cc/BR9R-GRCU]; Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of 
Justice, supra note 5; Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Three Pharm. Cos. 
Agree to Pay a Total of Over $122 Million to Resolve Allegations that They Paid Kickbacks 
Through Co-Pay Assistance Founds. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-
pharmaceutical-companies-agree-pay-total-over-122-million-resolve-allegations-they-paid 
[https://perma.cc/MXR2-3W4X]; Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Two 
Pharm. Cos. Agree to Pay a Total of Nearly $125 Million to Resolve Allegations that They Paid 
Kickbacks Through Copay Assistance Founds. (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
two-pharmaceutical-companies-agree-pay-total-nearly-125-million-resolve-allegations-they-paid 
[https://perma.cc/C53X-W9PW]; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dep’t of Justice, Sanofi 
Agrees to Pay $11.85 Million to Resolve Allegations That it Paid Kickbacks Through a Co-Pay 
Assistance Foundation (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/sanofi-agrees-pay-
1185-million-resolve-allegations-it-paid-kickbacks-through-co-pay [https://perma.cc/ZS4A-HQ5S]. 
 94. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Patient Servs. Inc. Agrees 
to Pay $3 Million for Allegedly Serving as a Conduit for Pharm. Cos. to Illegally Pay Patient 
Copayments (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/patient-services-inc-agrees-pay-3-
million-allegedly-serving-conduit-pharmaceutical-companies [https://perma.cc/KBR9-LLEK]; 
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dep’t of Justice, Founds. Resolve Allegations of Enabling 
Pharm. Cos. to Pay Kickbacks to Medicare Patients (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ 
usao-ma/pr/foundations-resolve-allegations-enabling-pharmaceutical-companies-pay-kickbacks-
medicare [https://perma.cc/R59H-GK8X]. 
 95. Ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012)). 
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Charity PAPs by pharmaceutical manufacturers violate the AKS by 
serving as “a conduit to pay kickbacks to Medicare patients taking [the 
manufacturers’] drugs.”96 Additionally, several courts have considered 
qui tam FCA actions against pharmaceutical companies predicated upon 
allegations that donations made to Independent Charity PAPs violated the 
AKS.97 This Part reviews this recent legal scrutiny of pharmaceutical 
manufacturer donations made to Independent Charity PAPs; it begins by 
providing a thumbnail sketch of the AKS and an overview of AKS 
regulatory guidance related to  Independent Charity PAPs. 
A.  The AKS: A Thumbnail Sketch 
Under the AKS it is unlawful to “knowingly and willfully” solicit, 
receive, offer, or pay “any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, 
or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind” to 
reward or induce the referral or purchase of “any item or service” paid 
for, at least in part, “under a Federal health care program.”98 Violating 
the AKS is a felony that is punishable by a maximum fine of $100,000 
and ten years of imprisonment.99 The AKS is enforced by the DOJ, which 
has authority over criminal prosecutions, and by the OIG, which has 
authority to “initiate administrative proceedings to exclude a person from 
Federal health care programs or to impose civil monetary penalties for 
kickback violations.”100 The AKS was amended by the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (ACA)101 to clarify that “a claim that includes 
items or services resulting from a violation of [the AKS] constitutes a 
false or fraudulent claim” under the FCA.102 Hence, the government and 
 
 96. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 94. 
 97. See United States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., 880 F.3d 89, 94 (3d Cir. 
2018); United States ex rel. Vitale v. MiMedx Grp., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 3d 647, 651 (D.S.C. 2019); 
United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b) (2012). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Supplemental Special Advisory Bulletin: Independent Charity Patient Assistance 
Programs, 79 Fed. Reg. 31,120, 31,121 (May 30, 2014); see Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. & Joan H. 
Krause, Kickbacks, Courtesies, or Cost-Effectiveness?: Application of the Medicare Antikickback 
Law to the Marketing and Promotional Practices of Drug and Medical Device Manufacturers, 54 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 279, 282 (1999). 
 101. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 
42 U.S.C.). 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g). The FCA imposes a civil penalty and treble damages upon: 
[A]ny person who– (A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval;  [or] (B) knowingly makes, uses, or 
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or 
fraudulent claim . . . . 
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qui tam relators can pursue a FCA action based upon an AKS violation.103 
The ACA also reduced the intent requirement of the AKS such that a 
person can violate the AKS despite either a lack of “actual knowledge” 
of the AKS or the “specific intent” to violate it.104 
Courts have interpreted the AKS expansively.105 In United States v. 
Greber,106 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit established the 
“one purpose” test for AKS violations.107 The Third Circuit held that 
payments the defendant made to a physician to induce referrals violated 
the AKS “even if the payments were also intended to compensate for 
professional services.”108 The court ruled that “if one purpose of the 
payment was to induce future referrals, the [AKS] has been violated.”109 
It reasoned that Congress intended the AKS to have a “deterrent effect” 
that would counter financial incentives to order unnecessary services.110 
 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012). The penalties and damages awarded under the FCA can be 
massive, especially where a high volume of false claims for Medicare reimbursement are 
involved. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(affirming a $237,454,195 judgment against a hospital found to have “knowingly submitted 
21,730 false claims to Medicare for reimbursement”). 
 103. See United States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 880 F.3d 89, 95 (3d 
Cir. 2018); cf. United States ex rel. King v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 871 F.3d 318, 324 n.1 (5th Cir. 
2017) (“The AKS provides no private right of action; therefore, a private plaintiff may not sue a 
health care provider under the AKS alone.” (quoting United States ex rel. Ruscher v. 
Omnicare, Inc., 663 F. App’x 368, 371 n.2 (5th Cir. 2016))), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2030 (2018).  
 104. Pub. L. 111-148, § 6402(f), 124 Stat. at 759 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7b(h)); see also Laura G. Hoey et al., Is the Current Anti-Kickback Enforcement Environment 
Stifling Innovation in Health Care?, BNA’S HEALTH L. REP., Aug. 10, 2017, at 1, 2 (noting that 
the ACA “lessened the intent standard” of the AKS). 
 105. See, e.g., Bulleit & Krause, supra note 100, at 283 (“The [AKS] has been held 
applicable to a wide variety of financial relationships that are quite different from an obvious 
kickback for a patient referral or a bribe to recommend the purchase of specific products or 
services.”); see also Hoey et al., supra note 104, at 2 (noting that the AKS is “both nebulous and 
broad”). 
 106. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 107. See id. at 69. 
 108. Id. at 72. 
 109. Id. at 69. The “one purpose” test espoused in Greber has been adopted widely. See, e.g., 
United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 30 (1st Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989); Bulleit & Krause, supra note 100, at 
283. However, “it may be a defense that an improper purpose was ‘incidental,’ ‘minor,’ or not 
‘material.’” Bulleit & Krause, supra note 100, at 283. Moreover, a “collateral hope for referrals” 
does not violate the AKS but “it may be difficult for a jury to distinguish between a motivating 
factor and a collateral hope or expectation.” See United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 834 
& n.7 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 110. Greber, 760 F.2d at 70–71. However, courts have acknowledged that: 
[T]he [AKS] does not make increased cost to the government the sole criterion 
of corruption. In prohibiting “kickbacks,” Congress need not have spelled out the 
obvious truisms that, while unnecessary expenditure of money earned and 
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The court also ruled that the statute’s reference to “‘any 
remuneration’ . . . includes not only sums for which no actual service was 
performed but also those amounts for which some professional time was 
expended” because “the potential for unnecessary drain on the Medicare 
system remains.”111  
At least one circuit court has suggested that defraying the cost of 
Medicare patients’ prescription drug co-pays is proscribed by the AKS. 
Writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United 
States ex rel. Grenadyor v. Ukrainian Village Pharmacy, Inc.,112 Judge 
Richard Posner offered a colorful explanation as to why co-pay discounts 
offered to Medicare beneficiaries by a pharmacy could violate the AKS: 
[W]hat is wrong with offering an inducement that reduces a 
product’s cost to the consumer? The answer is that a discount 
or refund can become a ‘kickback’ . . .  [where] it artificially 
inflates the price that the government pays pharmacies for 
prescription drugs for Medicare or Medicaid 
beneficiaries. . . .  
[A] refund to [a pharmacy] customer would thus have 
been a “kickback” in an appropriately pejorative sense 
because it would have increased the pharmacy’s sales (and 
presumably its profits, as otherwise it wouldn’t provide 
refunds) at the government’s expense. . . . It would have 
done so either by diverting customers from other pharmacies 
or by inducing customers to purchase drugs that they would 
not have been willing to purchase had they been responsible 
for the copay.113 
 
contributed by taxpaying fellow citizens may exacerbate the result of the crime, 
kickback schemes can freeze competing suppliers from the system, can mask the 
possibility of government price reductions, can misdirect program funds, and, 
when proportional, can erect strong temptations to order more drugs and supplies 
than needed. Nor need Congress have spelled out duties, beyond the duty of 
avoiding receipt and payment of kickbacks. 
United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 n.9 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Bulleit & Krause, 
supra note 100, at 282 (“[T]he main purpose of the [AKS] . . . [is to] prevent[] inappropriate 
financial considerations from influencing the amount, type, cost, or selection of the provider of 
medical care received by a federal health care program beneficiary.”). 
 111. Greber, 760 F.2d at 71; see also Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1398 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (“Congress introduced the broad term ‘remuneration’ in the 1977 amendment of the 
statute to clarify the types of financial arrangements and conduct to be classified as illegal under 
Medicare and Medicaid. The phrase ‘any remuneration’ was intended to broaden the reach of the 
law which previously referred only to kickbacks, bribes, and rebates.” (citations omitted)). 
 112. 772 F.3d 1102 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 113. Id. at 1104–05. The Grenadyor court ultimately held that the relator’s FCA allegations, 
which were premised in part upon the alleged kickbacks the defendant pharmacies made to 
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B.  AKS Safe Harbors and OIG Guidance 
In recognition of the vast and perplexing breadth of the AKS,114 
Congress has enacted several statutory exceptions115 and has required the 
OIG to promulgate regulations “specifying payment practices that shall 
not be treated as a criminal offense . . . and shall not serve as the basis for 
an exclusion under [the AKS].”116 These safe harbors offer an affirmative 
defense: “Once the government establishes the elements of a violation of 
the [AKS], the burden shifts to a defendant to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that her conduct fell within the safe harbor 
provision of the statute.”117  
The OIG promulgated the first AKS safe harbor regulations in 1991118 
and is required to annually solicit proposals for modifications and 
additions.119 Among the factors that the OIG considers when making 
changes to the safe harbors are the effects the change would have upon 
 
Medicare beneficiaries, were not pleaded with enough specificity. See id. at 1107 (“Grenadyor 
would have had to allege either that the pharmacy submitted a claim to Medicare (or Medicaid) 
on behalf of a specific patient who had received a kickback, or at least name a Medicare patient 
who had received a kickback (presumably if the pharmacy provided a drug to a Medicare patient 
it billed Medicare for the cost of the drug minus the copay).”). 
 114. See S. REP. NO. 100-109, at 27 (1987) (“It is the understanding of the Committee that 
the breadth of this statutory language has created uncertainty among health care providers as to 
which commercial arrangements are legitimate, and which are proscribed.”); see also Bulleit & 
Krause, supra note 100, at 285 (“[I]t may be difficult to think of a financial relationship in the 
health care industry that is not at risk for violation.”). 
 115. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (2012). 
 116. Medicare and Medicaid Patient Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93, 
§ 14(a), 101 Stat. 680, 697 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(E)); see also Hoey 
et al., supra note 104, at 2 (“Congress has provided for certain statutory exceptions and authorized 
the [OIG] to promulgate additional safe harbors to protect innocuous, or even potentially 
beneficial, business and payment practices.”). 
 117. United States v. George, 900 F.3d 405, 413 (7th Cir. 2018); see also MedPricer.com, 
Inc. v. Becton, Dixon & Co., 240 F. Supp. 3d 263, 275 (D. Conn. 2017) (holding that a defendant 
“cannot claim an exemption” under a regulatory safe harbor for a business arrangement that 
implicates the AKS without a showing that the arrangement “‘fit squarely’ within the safe 
harbor”), adhered to on reconsideration by 2017 WL 1234102 (D. Conn. Apr. 3, 2017). 
 118. See Bulleit & Krause, supra note 100, at 288. 
 119. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(a)(1)(A). Congress explained that the annual solicitation of 
safe harbor proposals is intended to promote: 
Greater public involvement in the process for identifying changes or 
additions to safe harbors, and fraud alerts will stimulate more timely and 
responsive information for assisting providers and suppliers in understanding 
Medicare requirements, as well as, enabling federal and state criminal justice 
agencies to focus on the most deliberate cases of fraudulent and abusive 
practices. 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-496, at 84 (1996). 
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the accessibility, quality, and cost of health care services as well as the 
amount of “competition among health care providers.”120 No statutory or 
regulatory AKS safe harbor currently addresses financial assistance 
provided to Medicare beneficiaries by Independent Charity PAPs.  
The OIG is also required to issue advisory opinions pertaining to the 
AKS.121 In doing so, the OIG “provide[s] guidance on what constitutes 
prohibited remuneration under the [AKS], whether an arrangement 
satisfies the criteria for a statutory exception or safe harbor, and whether 
an activity constitutes grounds for the imposition of sanctions.”122 
Advisory opinions can help provide clarity for businesses considering 
business arrangements that do not clearly fit an existing AKS safe 
harbor.123 To receive an advisory opinion, requestors must: “be a party to 
the arrangement, or proposed arrangement, that is the subject of the 
request”;124 must submit detailed information about themselves, the 
arrangement, and “other . . . parties to the arrangement”;125 and must 
certify to the truth and completeness of all of the information 
submitted.126 However, the opinions are applicable only to the requestor, 
bind only the OIG, and do not “limit[] the investigatory or prosecutorial 
authority of the OIG, DOJ or any other agency of the Government.”127 
Moreover, the OIG retains the right to “rescind, terminate, or modify [an] 
advisory opinion.”128 Importantly, “OIG advisory opinions do not 
establish rules of decision, and are not to receive judicial deference.”129 
 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(a)(2). 
 121. See id. § 1320a-7d(b). 
 122. Bulleit & Krause, supra note 100, at 293. 
 123. Id. at 293. 
 124. 42 C.F.R. § 1008.11 (2018). 
 125. Id. § 1008.36; see id. §§ 1008.37, .39 (discussing disclosure of other information).  
 126. See id. § 1008.38. 
 127. Id. § 1008.1; see id. §§ 1008.53, .59. 
 128. Id. § 1008.45. A rescinded advisory opinion “is revoked retroactively to the original 
date of issuance with the result that the advisory opinion will be deemed to have been without 
force and effect,” id. § 1008.45(b)(1), a terminated advisory opinion “is revoked as of the 
termination date and is no longer in force and effect after the termination date,” id. 
§ 1008.45(b)(2), and a modified advisory opinion “continues in full force and effect in modified 
form thereafter,” id. § 1008.45(b)(3). 
 129.  United States ex rel. McDonough v. Symphony Diagnostic Servs., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 
773, 780 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (“OIG advisory opinions, by regulation ‘have no application to any 
individual or entity that does not join in the request for the opinion.’” (quoting 42 C.F.R. 
§ 1008.53)). In Christensen v. Harris County, the U.S. Supreme Court held that agency 
“interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all 
of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference,” but may be “entitled to 
respect” as a persuasive authority. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)); see also Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Regulation by Amicus: The 
Department of Labor’s Policy Making in the Courts, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1223, 1239 (2013) 
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The OIG also issues guidance related to the AKS in the form of advisory 
bulletins.130 However, the interpretive guidance provided by these 
bulletins also lacks “the force of authoritative law.”131 
C.  OIG Guidance Related to Independent Charity PAPs 
The OIG has issued two advisory bulletins addressing AKS concerns 
related to Independent Charity PAPs.132 Additionally, the agency has 
published several advisory opinions that analyze the AKS implications of 
Independent Charity PAPs and protect certain structures from the 
imposition of administrative sanctions.133 
1.  Special Advisory Bulletins 
In 2005, in anticipation of the implementation of the Medicare Part D 
program, the OIG issued an advisory bulletin in response to 
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ “interest in continuing to assist Medicare 
Part D enrollees of limited means who do not qualify for the low-income 
subsidy” and concerns that financial assistance provided by 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer PAPs to Medicare beneficiaries for drugs 
covered by Part D would implicate the AKS.134 The OIG noted the 
importance of the long-standing “safety net assistance” provided by PAPs 
and expressed support for the “efforts of charitable organizations and 
others to assist financially needy beneficiaries, as long as the assistance 
is provided in a manner that does not” violate the AKS.135 The agency 
concluded that “[M]anufacturer PAPs that subsidize Part D cost-sharing 
amounts present heightened risks under the [AKS]” but found that 
properly structured “cost-sharing subsidies provided by bona fide, 
 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s evolving perspective “on the degree of deference to give an 
informal agency interpretation”). 
 130. See, e.g., Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs 
for Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,623, 70,628  (Nov. 22, 2005) (noting that “the 
OIG issues Special Advisory Bulletins about industry practices or arrangements that potentially 
implicate the fraud and abuse authorities subject to enforcement by OIG” as part of its effort to 
further the goals of “prevent[ing] fraud and abuse” under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996). 
 131. United States ex rel. Jamison v. McKesson Corp., 784 F. Supp. 2d 664, 677 n.10 (N.D. 
Miss. 2011) (ruling that an “OIG Special Advisory Opinion” was an “agency interpretation[]” that 
did not bind the court). 
 132. See Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for 
Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. at 70,623–24; Supplemental Special Advisory Bulletin: 
Independent Charity Patient Assistance Programs, 79 Fed. Reg. 31,120, 31,120–21 (May 30, 
2014).  
 133. See, e.g., Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs 
for Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. at 70,627 n.17. 
 134. Id. at 70,624. 
 135. Id. at 70,623–24. 
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independent charities unaffiliated with pharmaceutical manufacturers 
should not raise [AKS] concerns, even if the charities receive 
manufacturer contributions.”136 
The OIG reasoned that cost-sharing subsidies provided by a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer to Medicare Part D beneficiaries for the 
manufacturer’s own drugs “would be squarely prohibited by the statute, 
because the manufacturer would be giving something of value (i.e., the 
subsidy) to beneficiaries to use its product.”137 Moreover, the agency 
noted that Pharmaceutical Manufacturer PAPs that subsidize the 
manufacturer’s own products:  
present all of the usual risks of fraud and abuse associated 
with kickbacks, including steering beneficiaries to particular 
drugs; increasing costs to Medicare; providing a financial 
advantage over competing drugs; and reducing 
beneficiaries[’] incentives to locate and use less expensive, 
equally effective drugs.138 
In contrast, the OIG outlined parameters by which pharmaceutical 
manufacturers can donate to an Independent Charity PAP that provides 
cost-sharing assistance to Medicare Patients for Part D drugs without 
implicating the AKS.139 The OIG stated that donations to an Independent 
Charity PAP “should raise few, if any, [AKS] concerns” if: (1) the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer and its affiliates do not “exert[] any direct 
or indirect influence or control over the charity or the subsidy program”; 
(2) the Independent Charity PAP provides assistance in a manner such 
that it “cannot be attributed to the donating pharmaceutical 
manufacturer”; (3) the Independent Charity PAP provides aid “without 
regard to the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s interests and without regard 
to the beneficiary’s choice of product, provider, practitioner, supplier, or 
Part D drug plan”; (4) the Independent Charity PAP employs “a 
reasonable, verifiable, and uniform measure of financial need that is 
 
 136. Id. at 70,624. 
 137. Id. at 70,625. 
 138. Id. In particular, the agency pointed to concerns that Pharmaceutical Manufacturer 
PAPs could increase Medicare outlays if used in a way that would “increase the number of 
beneficiaries using the manufacturer’s product who reach the catastrophic benefit in any given 
coverage year and hasten the point . . . at which beneficiaries reach the catastrophic benefit.” Id. 
at 70,625–26. Additionally, the OIG noted its concern that “cost-sharing subsidies” could be used 
to “shield beneficiaries from the economic effects of drug pricing, thus eliminating a market 
safeguard against inflated prices.” Id. at 70,626. Furthermore, the OIG explained that 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer PAPs that provide in-kind assistance can “have the practical effect 
of locking beneficiaries into the manufacturer’s product” and that manufacturer-provided 
Medicare Part D cost-sharing subsidies would have a similar “steering effect.” Id. 
 139. Id. 
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applied in a consistent manner”; and (5) the donating “pharmaceutical 
manufacturer does not solicit or receive data from the charity that would 
[enable] the manufacturer [to] correlat[e] the amount [and] frequency of 
its donations with the number of subsidized prescriptions for its 
products.”140  
In sum, the OIG explained that an “[I]ndependent [C]harity PAP must 
not function as a conduit for payments by the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer to patients and must not impermissibly influence 
beneficiaries’ drug choices.”141 It expressed its apprehension that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers might seek to improperly influence 
Independent Charity PAPs “to ensure that the manufacturer’s 
contributions only or primarily benefit patients using its products” and 
“to maximize the number of beneficiaries qualifying for cost-sharing 
subsidies.”142 The agency noted that “cost-sharing subsidies can be very 
profitable for manufacturers . . . . So long as the manufacturer’s sales 
price for the product exceeds its marginal variable costs plus the amount 
of the cost-sharing assistance” and suggested that this potential 
profitability creates “incentives for abuse.”143 
In 2014, the OIG issued another advisory bulletin with “additional 
guidance” related to Independent Charity PAPs.144 The OIG again 
recognized the “important safety net assistance” that PAPs provide for 
patients unable to “afford their cost-sharing obligations for prescription 
drugs.”145 However, the agency pointed out that “[t]wo remunerative 
aspects of PAP arrangements require scrutiny under the [AKS]: donor 
contributions to PAPs (which can also be analyzed as indirect 
remuneration to patients) and PAPs’ grants to patients.”146 The OIG 
explained that the AKS “could be violated” by donations “made to a PAP 
to induce the PAP to recommend or arrange for the purchase of the 
donor’s federally reimbursable items” and by financial assistance 
provided to a patient by a PAP with the intent “to influence the patient to 
 
 140. Id. The OIG further stipulated that “[n]o individual patient information may be 
conveyed to donors” and “neither patients nor donors may be informed of the donation made to 
the PAP by others.” Id. at 70,626 n.16. Additionally, the OIG explained that “[r]eporting of data 
that is not in the aggregate or that is patient specific would be problematic, as would reporting of 
any data, whether or not in the aggregate, related to the identity, amount, or nature of subsidized 
drugs.” Id. 
 141. Id. at 70,627. 
 142. Id. at 70,626. 
 143. Id. 
 144. E.g., Supplemental Special Advisory Bulletin: Independent Charity Patient Assistance 
Programs, 79 Fed. Reg. 31,120, 31,120 (May 30, 2014). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 31,121. 
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purchase (or induce the patient’s physician to prescribe) certain items.”147 
The 2014 bulletin reiterated the OIG’s prior guidance that 
“pharmaceutical manufacturers can effectively contribute to the safety 
net by making cash donations to independent, bona fide charitable 
assistance programs” and expanded upon the factors the agency 
“believe[s] are fundamental to a properly structured Independent Charity 
PAP.”148 In particular, the agency focused on “[d]isease funds, eligible 
recipients, and the conduct of donors.”149 
The OIG stated that “disease funds should be defined in accordance 
with widely recognized clinical standards and in a manner that covers a 
broad spectrum of products; disease funds should not be defined for the 
purpose of limiting the drugs for which the Independent Charity PAP 
provides assistance.”150 The agency warned that Independent Charity 
PAPs with “narrowly defined disease funds may be subject to scrutiny if 
the disease funds result in funding exclusively or primarily the products 
of donors or if other facts and circumstances suggest that the disease fund 
is operated to induce the purchase of donors’ products.”151 The OIG also 
cited concerns that narrow disease funds that limit cost-sharing support 
to “expensive or specialty drugs” might reduce the benefit of Independent 
Charity PAPs for patients and could “steer patients in a manner that is 
costly to Federal health care programs and may even facilitate increases 
in drug prices.”152 Hence, it cautioned that:  
a fund will be subject to more scrutiny if it is limited to a 
subset of available products, rather than all products 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for 
treatment of the disease state(s) covered by the fund or all 
products covered by the relevant Federal health care 
program when prescribed for the treatment of the disease 
states (including generic or bioequivalent drugs).153  
Additionally, the OIG specified that “Independent Charity PAP[s] 
must determine [patient] eligibility according to a reasonable, verifiable, 
and uniform measure of financial need that is applied in a consistent 
manner.”154 Moreover, it concluded that “the cost of the particular drug 
for which the patient is applying for assistance is not an appropriate stand-
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 31,122. 
 151. Id. at 31,121. 
 152. Id. at 31,122. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id.  
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alone factor in determining individual financial need.”155 The OIG also 
pointed out that “actions by donors to correlate their funding of PAPs 
with support for their own products . . . may be indicative of a donor’s 
intent to channel its financial support to copayments of its own products, 
which would implicate the [AKS].”156 
2.  Advisory Opinions 
The OIG has issued several favorable advisory opinions to 
Independent Charity PAPs.157 Under these favorable advisory opinions, 
the OIG typically promises not to sanction the requestor even though the 
arrangement contemplated in the opinion could violate the AKS.158 In its 
2014 bulletin, the OIG noted that:  
[F]avorable [advisory] opinions related to PAPs typically are 
based upon the charity’s certifications that: (1) No donor or 
affiliate of any donor has exerted or will exert any direct or 
indirect influence or control over the charity or any of the 
charity’s programs; (2) the charity will define its disease 
funds in accordance with widely recognized clinical 
standards and in a manner that covers a broad spectrum of 
available products; and (3) the charity’s disease funds will 
not be defined by reference to specific symptoms, severity 
of symptoms, or the method of administration of drugs.159 
Moreover, since publishing its 2014 bulletin, the OIG has issued 
modifications to many favorable advisory opinions related to 
Independent Charity PAPs.160 These modifications include additional 
certifications that the Independent Charity PAP requestors: (1) will define 
disease funds broadly to cover at least all FDA-approved drugs for the 
type of disease; (2) “will not maintain any disease fund that provides 
copayment assistance for only one drug, or only the drugs made or 
 
 155. Id. (“[G]enerous financial need criteria, particularly when a fund is limited to a subset 
of available drugs or the drugs of a major donor, could be evidence of intent to fund a substantial 
part of the copayments for a particular drug (or drugs) for the purpose of inducing the use of that 
drug (or those drugs), rather than for the purpose of supporting financially needy patients 
diagnosed with a particular disease.”). 
 156. Id. at 31,123. 
 157. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 158. See, e.g., Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., OIG 
Advisory Op. No. 07-06 (July 23, 2007), https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/ 
2007/AdvOpn07-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AMR-YG2Y]. 
 159. Supplemental Special Advisory Bulletin: Independent Charity Patient Assistance 
Programs, 79 Fed. Reg. at 31,121 n.8.  
 160. See, e.g., Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., Notice of 
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marketed by one manufacturer or its affiliates”; (3) will provide 
assistance, regardless of price, “for all prescription medications, 
including generic or bioequivalent drugs, approved by the FDA for 
treatment of the disease state(s) covered by the fund”; and (4) will make 
all patient eligibility decisions based upon “a reasonable, verifiable, and 
uniform measure of financial need that is applied in a consistent 
manner.”161 
In November 2017, the OIG rescinded a favorable advisory opinion 
that had been issued to CVC, an Independent Charity PAP.162 The OIG 
explained that it took the unprecedented step of rescinding the opinion163 
because CVC had: 
(i) provided patient-specific data to one or more donors that 
would enable the donor(s) to correlate the amount and 
frequency of their donations with the number of subsidized 
prescriptions or orders for their products, and (ii) allowed 
donors to directly or indirectly influence the identification or 
delineation of Requestor’s disease categories.164 
The OIG reasoned that CVC’s actions represented a failure to comply 
with certifications that “the arrangement interposed an independent, bona 
fide charitable organization between donors and patients.”165 
Furthermore, the OIG stressed concerns that the failure “materially 
increased the risk that [CVC] served as a conduit for financial assistance 
from a pharmaceutical manufacturer donor to a patient, and thus 
increased the risk that the patients who sought assistance from [CVC] 
would be steered to federally reimbursable drugs that the manufacturer 
donor sold.”166 
D.  DOJ Investigations 
A notable example of the DOJ’s recent scrutiny of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers’ donations to Independent Charity PAPs is the $210 
million agreement that UT, a manufacturer of PAH drugs, entered into 
with the DOJ to settle claims that UT had “violated the [FCA] by paying 
 
 161. Id. at 2–3.  
 162. See OIG Rescission of Adv. Op. No. 06-04, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
 163. See Robert Langreth & Ben Elgin, Drug Charity May Shutter After U.S. Faults Pharma 
Influence, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2017, 12:17 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2017-11-29/pharma-charity-may-shut-after-u-s-faults-drugmakers-influence [https://perma.cc/ 
5739-9CPF]. 
 164. OIG Rescission of Adv. Op. No. 06-04, supra note 4, at 2. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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kickbacks to Medicare patients” through an Independent Charity PAP.167 
The DOJ contended that UT had donated to and used a PAH disease fund 
operated by CVC “as a conduit to pay the copay obligations of thousands 
of Medicare patients taking [UT’s PAH drugs], to eliminate price 
sensitivity of patients purchasing or physicians prescribing the [PAH] 
[d]rugs, and to induce those patients’ purchases of the [PAH] [d]rugs.”168  
The DOJ further alleged that UT’s donations to CVC were based upon 
“the revenue it would receive from prescriptions for Medicare patients 
who received assistance from CVC to cover their copays for [UT’s PAH] 
[d]rugs.”169 Additionally, UT had purportedly collected and used data 
from CVC to determine how many and to what extent patients taking 
UT’s PAH drugs received assistance from CVC and “to confirm that 
UT’s revenue far exceeded the amount of UT’s donations to CVC.”170 
Moreover, the DOJ alleged UT had “referred Medicare patients 
prescribed [UT’s PAH] [d]rugs to CVC, which resulted in claims to 
federal healthcare programs to cover the cost of the drugs.”171 
As part of the settlement agreement, UT entered into a Corporate 
Integrity Agreement (CIA) with the OIG.172 In the CIA, UT committed 
to “vest sole responsibility and authority for budgeting and other donation 
related activities relating to Independent Charity PAPs” in an 
independent committee separate from its “sales, marketing, and similar 
commercial business units.”173 UT also agreed that in order to make a 
donation to an Independent Charity PAP it will not: (1) “influence or 
control” the creation of any of the Independent Charity PAP’s “specific 
disease funds” or any changes thereto; (2) “influence or control . . . the 
Independent Charity PAP’s” patient assistance eligibility criteria or 
determinations; (3) “solicit or receive . . . any data or information from 
the Independent Charity PAP that would enable it to correlate the amount 
or frequency of its donations with support for [UT’s] products or 
 
 167. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dep’t of Justice, United Therapeutics Agrees to 
Pay $210 Million to Resolve Allegations that It Paid Kickbacks Through a Co-Pay Assistance 
Found. (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/united-therapeutics-agrees-pay-210-
million-resolve-allegations-it-paid-kickbacks-through [https://perma.cc/Z3PK-2UHX]. 
 168. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at 2. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 3; see OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & 
UNITED THERAPEUTICS CORP., CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND UNITED 
THERAPEUTICS CORPORATION 1 (Dec. 18, 2017), https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/United_ 
Therapeutics_Corporation_12182017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ATG-2MGW]. 
 173. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & UNITED 
THERAPEUTICS CORP., supra note 172, at 18. 
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services”; or (4) “provide donations for a disease state fund that covers 
only a single product or that covers only [UT’s] products.”174 
E.  FCA Qui Tam Cases Predicated on Independent Charity 
PAP Donations 
Three recent qui tam FCA suits have touched upon the AKS 
implications of Independent Charity PAP donations. In United States ex 
rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc.,175 the Third Circuit 
considered a qui tam relator’s allegation that Accredo, a specialty 
pharmacy, had violated the FCA because donations Accredo made to an 
Independent Charity PAP were illicit kickbacks under the AKS.176 The 
relator argued that Accredo’s decision to to donate to the Independent 
Charity PAPs was based upon a belief that donating would have a 
favorable effect on the pharmacy’s business.177 The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the pharmacy after finding that the relator 
had “failed to provide evidence of even a single federal claim for 
reimbursement by Accredo that was linked to the alleged kickback 
scheme.”178 The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and 
notably declined to “express [a] view on whether Accredo’s charitable 
contributions were illegal kickbacks under the [AKS].”179 
In United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp.,180 the U.S. District 
Court for the Central District of California held that Celgene, a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer, could not “be liable for giving money” to 
Independent Charity PAPs without “evidence that the[] donations were 
contingent on the foundation’s agreement to purchase or recommend 
Celgene’s drugs.”181 The FCA qui tam relator in Brown alleged that 
Celgene had violated the AKS by “directing money through [Independent 
Charity PAPs] to induce patients to buy its drugs.”182 The relator pointed 
to donations that Celgene had made to Independent Charity PAPs 
allegedly “for the purpose of helping patients (including those enrolled in 
Medicare) pay co-payments for [cancer] drugs.”183 However, the court 
reasoned that the relator’s evidence suggested that the donations did not 
depend upon any “agreement to purchase or recommend Celgene’s 
 
 174. Id. at 20. 
 175. 880 F.3d 89 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 176. Id. at 94. 
 177. See id. at 92. 
 178. Id. at 91. 
 179. Id. at 93 n.4, 100. 
 180. 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 181. Id. at 1057. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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drugs” because “one of the [Independent Charity PAPs] funded by 
Celgene, would reimburse ten different [cancer] drugs, only three of 
which were manufactured by Celgene.”184 
Most recently, in United States ex rel. Vitale v. MiMedx Group, 
Inc.,185 the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina denied, 
in part, a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s motion to dismiss as to a 
relator’s FCA causes of action premised upon violations of the AKS 
stemming from donations the manufacturer had allegedly made to an 
Independent Charity PAP (PAN Foundation). Specifically, the relator 
alleged that the manufacturer had donated to PAN Foundation “while 
manipulating the submission of patient assistance applications to ensure 
its contributions fund[ed] only patients seeking [its] products.”186 The 
court reasoned, inter alia, that the FCA causes of action should survive 
the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss because the relator alleged that the 
manufacturer “knowingly and willfully paid a remuneration,” the cost-
sharing responsibility of Medicare beneficiaries, “indirectly” through 
“correlated” donations to PAN Foundation “to induce” Medicare 
beneficiaries “to purchase [the manufacturer’s] Products.”187 
III.  WHY INDEPENDENT CHARITY PAPS MAY WARRANT 
SAFE HARBOR PROTECTIONS 
The scrutiny of pharmaceutical manufacturer donations to 
Independent Charity PAPs by federal prosecutors and the reconsideration 
of favorable advisory opinions by the OIG have generated an uncertain 
legal environment for the charitable entities and their pharmaceutical 
industry donors. In light of this uncertainty, one Independent Charity 
PAP, CVC, has suspended its provision of financial aid, and 
pharmaceutical industry donations to Independent Charity PAPs have 
 
 184. Id. at 1057 & n.33. 
 185. 381 F. Supp. 3d 647 (D.S.C. 2019). 
 186. Id. at 651, 659. 
 187. Id. at 659. It was alleged that: 
[The manufacturer] would encourage sales representatives to identify patients of 
[the manufacturer’s] medical provider clients who would be eligible for PAN 
[Foundation] funding to cover Medicare coinsurance and copays and prepare 
PAN [Foundation] applications for them. [The manufacturer] would then make 
charitable contributions to and fund PAN [Foundation] in an amount correlated 
with the number of patients [the manufacturer] had identified who would be 
seeking PAN [Foundation] funding. [The manufacturer] would next have its 
sales representatives, who had been told to hold applications until the PAN 
[Foundation] funds were funded, rush to submit applications. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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reportedly declined.188 This Part explains the uncertain AKS implications 
of Independent Charity PAPs and analyzes whether a new AKS safe 
harbor is warranted to provide greater clarity for these entities and their 
donors. 
A.  OIG Guidance Provides Limited Protection for Independent 
Charity PAP Donors 
In its guidance, the OIG has repeatedly recognized Independent 
Charity PAPs as an important safety net for financially vulnerable 
Medicare beneficiaries who face high prescription drug costs.189 The 
agency has also stated that pharmaceutical manufacturers can lawfully 
contribute to Independent Charity PAPs through “properly structured” 
arrangements.190 However, adherence to the OIG’s guidelines does not 
guarantee that donations made by pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
Independent Charity PAPs will not trigger an AKS violation.191 The 
OIG’s bulletins and advisory opinions suggest how the OIG will exercise 
its prosecutorial discretion but do not offer legally binding protection 
from DOJ prosecutions or qui tam litigants.192  
The DOJ highlighted this point in a Statement of Interest that it filed 
in Vitale.193 In response to the defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer’s 
motion to dismiss, the DOJ argued that OIG “advisory opinions issued to 
501(c)(3) foundations and other guidance do not alter the elements of the 
AKS or represent an exhaustive list of considerations of AKS liability as 
to [the defendant].”194 The DOJ asserted that, despite the OIG’s guidance 
regarding donations to Independent Charity PAPs, “the AKS not only 
prohibits pharmaceutical companies from ‘directly’ paying Medicare 
copays to induce purchases of their products, the statute also prohibits 
 
 188. See Rockoff, supra note 25 (reporting that federal investigations into Independent 
Charity PAPs have spooked the pharmaceutical industry and led to a drop in manufacturer 
donations to Independent Charity PAPs); supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.  
 189. See, e.g., Supplemental Special Advisory Bulletin: Independent Charity Patient 
Assistance Programs, 79 Fed. Reg. 31,120, 31,120 (May 30, 2014). 
 190. Id. at 31,121. 
 191. Indeed, the OIG itself acknowledged that “[a] determination regarding whether a 
particular arrangement violates the [AKS] requires an individualized evaluation of all of the 
relevant facts and circumstances, including the parties’ intent.” Id. Additionally, favorable 
advisory opinions issued to Independent Charity PAPs have focused “on the charities that 
requested the opinions—not the donors.” Id. at 31,123. 
 192. See United States ex rel. McDonough v. Symphony Diagnostic Servs., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 
3d 773, 780 (S.D. Ohio 2014); United States ex rel. Jamison v. McKesson Corp., 784 F. Supp. 2d 
664, 677 n.10 (N.D. Miss. 2011). 
 193. See United States’ Statement of Interest at 8, United States ex rel. Vitale v. MiMedx 
Grp., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 3d 647 (D.S.C. 2019) (No. 3:17-cv-00166-RBH).  
 194. Id. 
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them from using intermediaries to accomplish the same goal 
‘indirectly.’”195 Moreover, the DOJ contended that the OIG’s guidance 
“do[es] not create new conditions, the non-compliance with which must 
be specifically pled to sufficiently allege an AKS violation,” but instead 
“represent[s] the conditions under which [the OIG] agreed to refrain from 
certain administrative enforcement action against [the Independent 
Charity PAP].”196  
The DOJ softened its stance by noting that “strictly adher[ing] to the 
letter and spirit of the safeguards in an existing [OIG] advisory 
opinion . . . might provide [an] entity with a basis to assert that it did not 
possess the requisite intent to violate the AKS.”197 Notably, the Brown court 
appeared to apply similar logic in holding that a showing that a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer had donated to an Independent Charity PAP 
that provided financial assistance for a broad class of drugs, a minority of 
which were the manufacturer’s, was insufficient to establish an AKS 
violation.198 Indeed, the Brown court implicitly accepted the premise that 
adherence to OIG guidance favoring Independent Charity PAP arrangements 
that commit to “cover[ing] a broad spectrum of available products” could 
disprove the intent necessary to violate the AKS.199  
However, the Brown court analyzed only the relationship between the 
manufacturer and the charity.200 It did not address the relator’s reference to 
testimony that Celgene “gave tens of millions of dollars per year to non-
profit organizations for the purpose of helping patients (including those 
enrolled in Medicare) pay co-payments for [cancer] drugs.”201 Instead, the 
Brown court reasoned that, without evidence that the manufacturer’s 
“donations were contingent on the foundation’s agreement to purchase or 
recommend the [manufacturer’s] drugs,” the donations could not have 
violated the AKS.202 This overlooks the DOJ’s point that the AKS “also 
prohibits [manufacturers] from using intermediaries to . . . ‘indirectly’” 
induce Medicare beneficiaries to purchase the manufacturer’s drugs by 
defraying the beneficiaries’ co-payments.203  
Although Brown supports the theory that compliance with OIG 
 
 195. Id. at 6. 
 196. Id. at 8. 
 197. Id. at 9 n.4 (“Such an inquiry would involve a fact-specific, case-by-case 
determination.”). 
 198. See United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1057 & n.33 
(C.D. Cal 2016). 
 199. Supplemental Special Advisory Bulletin: Independent Charity Patient Assistance 
Programs, 79 Fed. Reg. 31,120, 31,121 n.8 (May 30, 2014). 
 200. See Brown, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 1057. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. United States’ Statement of Interest, supra note 193, at 6. 
 
30
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss3/8
2020] ARE GOOD DEEDS BEING PUNISHED? 669 
 
 
guidelines may be sufficient to negate an inference that a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer’s donations to an Independent Charity PAP were intended to 
induce Medicare beneficiaries to purchase the manufacturer’s drugs, it does 
not stand for the proposition that compliance with OIG guidelines always 
shelters such donations from the AKS. Given the breadth of the AKS, a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer’s donations to an Independent Charity PAP 
may yet run afoul of the AKS, despite strict compliance with OIG guidelines, 
where evidence—perhaps like the return on investment analysis referenced 
by the relator in Greenfield204—demonstrates that at least one purpose of a 
manufacturer’s donations was to indirectly induce Medicare beneficiaries to 
purchase its drugs. Hence, as the DOJ’s Statement of Interest in Vitale 
indicates, compliance with the OIG’s guidelines may not be a reliable 
defense against allegations that donations made to an Independent 
Charity PAP violated the AKS.205 This precipitates an uncertain legal 
environment206 that may deter manufacturers from donating at all207 and, 
in the case of CVC,208 has deterred at least one charity from operating.  
B.  Should the OIG Promulgate an AKS Safe Harbor Regulation for 
Independent Charity PAPs? 
In the face of this uncertainty, the pharmaceutical industry has called 
for the OIG to promulgate a new AKS safe harbor to “provide more 
concrete guardrails for companies in evaluating whether support of 
independent charitable foundations are appropriate in a given 
circumstance.”209 So too has at least one Independent Charity PAP.210 As 
 
 204. See United States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 880 F.3d 89, 92 (3d 
Cir. 2018). 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 193–196. 
 206. See Rockoff, supra note 25; Letter from John A. Murphy, III, Deputy Gen. Counsel for 
Health, Biotechnology Innovation Org., to Susan Edwards, Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 26, 2018) [hereinafter BIO Comment Letter], https://www. 
regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=HHSIG-2018-0002-0283&attachmentNumber=1 
&contentType=pdf [https://perma .cc/62GU-BGEJ] (“[W]hen evaluating charitable support 
programs through the lens of small emerging biotechnology companies, the state of the law and 
guidances is murky.”). 
 207. See Cameron T. Norris, Reviving Hanlester Network: A Safe Harbor for Harmless 
Remunerations Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 137, 154 (2014) 
(“[E]ven if the government does not go after borderline cases in practice, the AKS still allows 
them to in theory. The mere possibility of prosecution may be enough to deter health care 
providers from engaging in innovative and beneficial arrangements in the first place.”). 
 208. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 209. BIO Comment Letter, supra note 206, at 8. 
 210. See Press Release, APNews, Good Days Settles Inquiries (Oct. 25, 2019), 
https://www.apnews.com/PR%20Newswire/f5477ed6611f8014cb815d60d0f96266 [https://  
perma.cc/46LZ-T92M] (“‘We will continue to comply with all regulatory requirements 
surrounding charitable copay assistance programs and we welcome further clarity and OIG 
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commentators have pointed out, it is not uncommon for the 
“pharmaceutical industry [to] protest[] that the paucity of case, statutory 
and regulatory guidance regarding the application of anti-fraud laws to 
them, and almost exclusive reliance on enforcement to convey the 
government’s interpretation of and obtain compliance with these laws is 
unreasonable, inefficient and expensive.”211 However, in the context of 
the AKS implications of industry donations to Independent Charity 
PAPs, these criticisms seem apt given the limits of the OIG’s guidance 
and the DOJ’s reliance on settlements of potentially massive FCA 
liability to alter the behavior of industry donors.212 If Independent Charity 
PAPs are indeed an important safety net for financially needy Medicare 
beneficiaries, then the OIG should take these calls seriously and 
promulgate an AKS safe harbor regulation to ensure that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers can lawfully contribute to Independent Charity PAPs. 
According to former Inspector General Richard Kusserow: “[S]afe 
harbor regulations are a significant step toward alleviating concerns about 
the proper interpretation of the [AKS]. They give the health care 
community specific guideposts by which to tailor conduct, and thereby 
avoid prosecution for a kickback violation.”213 Congress specifically 
granted the OIG the authority to promulgate AKS safe harbor regulations 
in response to uncertainty about the reach of the AKS.214 Furthermore, 
promulgating an AKS safe harbor regulation engages the public in the 
process of identifying which arrangements among federal health care 
program stakeholders are beneficial and worthy of protection from the 
reach of the AKS.215 
A safe harbor may facilitate a balanced regulatory approach that can 
both protect against abusive uses of Independent Charity PAPs and 
preserve the safety net aid these entities provide to financially vulnerable 
patients.216 In its guidance, the OIG has already identified criteria for 
 
guidance to ensure we can continue to put patients in need first,’ said Clorinda Walley, President 
of Good Days.”). 
 211. Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate 
Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health Care, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 
89, 98 (2009). 
 212. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 213. Richard P. Kusserow, The Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute and the Safe 
Harbor Regulations—What’s Next?, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 49, 62 (1992). 
 214. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(E) (2012); supra notes 114–116 and accompanying 
text.  
 215. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(a); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-496, at 84 (1996) (noting 
Congress’s intent to encourage “public involvement in the process” of promulgating safe harbors). 
 216. Other agencies face similar challenges balancing competing interests in light of broad 
prohibitions against industry conduct. For instance, the FDA has intermittently employed binding 
and non-binding “safe harbor” guidance to address its concerns about the promotion of off-label 
drug use through industry-sponsored Continuing Medical Education (CME) programming. See 
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pharmaceutical manufacturer donations to Independent Charity PAPs 
that reduce the risks of fraud and abuse.217 By codifying these factors as 
a safe harbor, the OIG would establish certainty for Independent Charity 
PAPs and their donors, but would not be condoning any conduct beyond 
what the agency has already concluded is appropriate.218 Indeed, by 
clearly delineating the conditions under which pharmaceutical 
manufacturer donations to Independent Charity PAPs are permissible, a 
safe harbor would be responsive to those who have called upon the OIG 
to strengthen its regulation of such donations.219 Even critics suggest that 
compliance with the criteria the OIG has previously suggested “could 
maximize the benefits and reduce the harms” of pharmaceutical 
manufacturer donations to Independent Charity PAPs.220 A safe harbor 
would also provide a more stable regulatory structure than ad hoc 
guidance and would likely reduce the need for drastic measures to prevent 
interruptions in financially vulnerable Medicare beneficiaries’ access to 
prescription drugs, such as the OIG’s response to CVC’s sudden 
suspension of financial assistance.221 The provision of free drugs from a 
manufacturer arguably presents a stronger risk of steering than general 
financial assistance from an Independent Charity PAP because the patient 
must choose only that manufacturer’s drugs and would not be able to use 
 
generally Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free Speech v. Public Health 
Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31 (2011) (discussing the FDA’s difficulty 
balancing constraints on the dissemination of information about the use of drugs and medical 
devices with First Amendment commercial free speech protections).   
 217. See supra Section II.C. 
 218. Moreover, a safe harbor protecting arrangements that defray Medicare beneficiaries’ 
cost-sharing responsibilities would not be unprecedented. Statutory AKS safe harbors currently 
protect drug price discounts provided to Medicare beneficiaries in certain circumstances. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3); see also Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient 
Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,623, 70,624 & n.4 (Nov. 22, 
2005) (noting that a “safe harbor protects cost-sharing waivers offered to individuals who qualify 
for the [LIS]”). Under the Medicare Gap Discount Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-114ag, 
“[m]anufacturers of brand-name drugs and originator biologics must provide a 50 percent 
discount during the coverage-gap phase of the [Medicare Part D] benefit as a condition for Part D 
to cover their drugs.” MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 57, at 402. 
 219. Katherine Kraschel & Gregory Curfman, Patient Assistance Programs and Anti-
Kickback Laws, 322 JAMA 405, 406 (2019). 
 220. Howard, supra note 11, at 99 (“Drug companies could maximize the benefits and reduce 
the harms associated with patient-assistance programs by targeting their assistance to low-income 
patients; providing assistance for all medical expenses, not just expenses for a specific drug; and 
limiting assistance to patients whose out-of-pocket costs have exceeded a threshold, similar to 
what is done when an out-of-pocket maximum is used in an insurance plan. Programs constructed 
along these lines would expand patient access without undermining the beneficial aspects of cost 
sharing.”); see also Ubel & Bach, supra note 11, at 879 (suggesting short-term and long-term 
approaches to reduce “[t]he inflationary effects of copay assistance” and “address the underlying 
problem—the disassociation of drug prices from the benefits those drugs deliver”). 
 221. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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the in-kind assistance to defray ancillary treatment costs.  
CONCLUSION 
Fueled by drug company donations, Independent Charity PAPs have 
grown rapidly over the past two decades. These charitable entities offer a 
financial refuge for ailing Medicare beneficiaries struggling to afford 
their prescription drugs. However, federal prosecutors, qui tam relators, 
and regulators have increasingly scrutinized the relations between the 
pharmaceutical industry and Independent Charity PAPs. This scrutiny 
has exposed uncertainty about the applicability of the AKS to 
Independent Charity PAPs and their donors. To preserve the safety net 
assistance provided by Independent Charity PAPs and guard against the 
risk that misuse of these entities will lead to waste and abuse of federal 
health insurance program resources, it may be necessary for the OIG to 
promulgate an AKS regulatory safe harbor for Independent Charity PAPs 
and their donors. 
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